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THE VICTORY OF THE PRUSSIAN
RAILWAY “DYNAMIC” ACCOUNTING
OVER THE PUBLIC FINANCE AND
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STAGE OF CAPITALIST FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING AND A TESTIMONY
AGAINST THE AGENCY AND THE
MARKET FOR EXCUSES THEORIES
Abstract: The history of accounting for private railway companies in
Germany shows that these companies played a major role in the diffusion of historical cost accounting principles and gave birth, together with big other joint stock companies, to the “dynamic” or second
stage of capitalist accounting, at least in continental Europe.
If the representatives of such railway companies did not develop new
concepts of accounting, notably as concerned depreciation, they had,
by 1875-1879, elaborated a new theory of accounting (historical cost
or dynamic theory).This theory had a profound impact at least on the
German theorists of the late 19th century and early 20th centuries
such as Simon, Rieger and Schmalenbach.
This new theory was needed to justify a new law favoring shareholders in a hurry for returns on their investments rather than company
creditors. It also defeated the ideology of public finance and patrimonial (or static) theories of accounting. This new theory preceded
the law which promulgated the new approach and clearly defended
the private interests of shareholders as opposed to those of the public
in the strict sense. It appears to contradict Watts and Zimmermann’s
basic hypothesis of the «theory of market excuses». Agency theory
seemingly does not to apply either, for the new theory was proposed
by managers allied to shareholders, specifically those «hurried share-
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holders”, against creditors. This is why a kind of «theory of alliance»
appears to be more consistent with these developments. The main
reasons for developing the new accounting theory were linked to the
issue of dividends. It was necessary to find an accounting approach
which would allow the distribution of dividends at the very beginning
of an investment cycle. It was also intended to find an accounting approach which would ensure that profits were distributed as evenly as
possible throughout the entire investment cycle and among the different shareholders who had financed the investment.
Hence, the second stage of the capitalist accounting development
was not connected to measure of performance or information problems (monitoring and bonding) but seems to have been caused by
the need to regulate profits and dividends in the interests of managers and shareholders. However, as this change took place within the
framework of prudence, it was impossible, at that stage of capitalist
accounting, to achieve a perfect smoothing of the rate of accounting
profit. The solution to this problem was only to be found at the end of
the 20th century with the onset of the third or actuarial stage and the
“discovery” of fair value.

INTRODUCTION
Accounting for railway companies is considered to have
played a major role in the evolution of accounting thought and
practice. This role increased, at least from a theoretical point of
view, as leaders of the positivist school referring to Anglo-Saxon
accounting literature concerning railways, demonstrate that accounting theories are normative and used as excuses for political action [Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, pp. 273 and 290].
In America and England the history of railway accounting
is relatively well known thanks to a wide range of references
written over the last seventy five years [Mason ,1933],[Littleton
,1933],[May,1936],[Pollins,1956],[Brief,1966,1967],[Kitchen,197
4],[Boockholdt,1978],[Glynn, 1984],[Edwards,1985,1986,1989]
and [Bryer,1991]. By contrast, recent literature on the history of
accounting for German railway companies is sparse and does
not deal with the subject specifically [Oberbrinckmann, 1990],
[Schneider, 1987]. There is also some older rather technical
literature which is rarely referred to because it is written in German [Reden, 1843], [Passow, 1919], [Barth, 1953] and [Mieles,
1932]. However, this history deserves to be brought to light and
made accessible to a larger public in the context of the modern
debate about the political and social roles of accounting. It is
our intention to fulfil this double task of exhumation and reinterpretation of the history of German railway accounting. Here
we focus on the history of private Prussian railway companies
which have played such a major role in the development of
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the German railway system. Our period of study starts in 1838
which coincides with the passing of the first law on accounting
for railways and ends in 1884 with the passing of the joint stock
law. The latter law was very important, marking a key turning
point in the history of German accounting, under the influence of railway managers and their shareholders. Our objective
is mainly to respond to traditional questions that have been
raised in Anglo- American literature. A first group of questions
concerns the role played by railway accounting in the diffusion
of new accounting techniques and the reasons why a specific
system of accounting has appeared. A second group of questions
focuses on theoretical problems: did the development of the
Prussian approach to railway accounting influence the developments on any specific accounting theory? If this is the case,
does the thesis developed by Watts and Zimmerman according
to which “accounting theory satisfies the demand for excuses”
apply in the German or Prussian case? In a more general sense
does agency theory suit the role played by social actors (managers, creditors and shareholders) in the development of a new
accounting philosophy?
Presently, Germany, from an accounting point of view,
is characterised as a “code law” country [Nobes, 1992]. This
feature is not new and applies to Prussian railway accounting
which was strictly regulated with an impressive number of specific or general laws passed in 1838, 1839, 1843, 1861, 1870 and
1884. Each law was the ground for lawyers who defended different positions concerning accounting. The study of this invaluable material will constitute the object of the first part of this article following a brief presentation of the historical background.
The second part will be devoted to answering the questions we
have previously listed.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Prussia, at the end of the 1820s and the beginning of the
1830s, the very first railway lines were constructed and managed
by private companies1. This situation lasted up to the end of the
1840s when the State began either to buy (and manage) some
companies, such as the Ostbahn and the Saarbrückereisenbahn,
or to take over the management of some private companies,
1
Among the very first ones are lines joining different mines such as the
Hardsteiner Review Eberfeld line opened in 1829, and the Deilbach Teilstrecke
opened in 1831 [Steitz 1974, pp. 105-109] all founded by an association of private
undertakers.
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such as the Aachen-Düsseldorfer and the Bergisch-Märkischen
railway companies [Mieles, 1932, p. 37]. However, by 1862, the
role of the State was not yet dominant as illustrated by the following summary [Steitz 1974, p. 90 quoting Kech’s Eisenbahnpolitik]:
fully owned and managed by the State: 1562 km
privately owned but managed by the State: 1355 km
fully owned and managed by private companies: 3050
km
It was only during the nineties that the State, in the context
of an economic crisis, took the lead through substantial purchases of private railway companies. This progressive growth of
government control culminated in the complete nationalisation
of the last remaining private railway companies. In this study,
which ends with the joint stock law of 1884, we are only dealing
with privately owned railway companies.
Through-out this period, and especially during the thirties
and the forties, the main problem with German private rail
companies was one of financing. The private companies had
hoped that the government would finance their operations with
state-bonds2 but until 1842 this was difficult because of the law
of “January17, 1820” (Staats-schuldenedikt) which forced the
Prussian authorities to ask for special authorisation from the
Parliament [Steitz, 1974, p.170]. So, realistically, up to the forties, private rail companies had depended on private capital.
The challenge was not so much a lack of capital as a problem
of profits. As Hansemann, a proprietor of textile and insurance
companies of Aachen, and one of the founders of the KölnMindener (Cologne-Minder) railway company put it, the crucial
point was not the capital but the “hope for profits” [Hansemann,
1837, p. 30]. For most potential capitalists, at least, the expectation of profits was for rapid profits if not an immediate return
on their investment [Steitz, 1974, pp. 31 and 52].
This demand for immediate and “guaranteed” profits not
only clashed with the risk taking approach of “true capitalists”
but was also in total conflict with the nature of investments in
2
If they succeeded in doing that, it could be the occasion for some founders
to get very high profits, along with the leverage effect [Eichholtz, 1962, pp. 154].
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rail companies which require long periods of construction and
also some difficulties at first to have an effective management.
As the German history of railways shows, as soon as the hope
for rapid profits vanished, many capitalists refused to go on
financing the capital already subscribed3 and sometimes preferred to demand the dissolution of the company. Among the
main well known illustrations of this kind of situation, is the
case of the Leipzig-Dresdener Eisenbahn, whose Magdeburg’s
shareholders led a campaign in the newspapers in 1839 to demand a general assembly to decide on the dissolution of the
company. And especially the Rhein-Weserbahngesellschaft case,
which, in 1844, was driven to dissolution by its frightened shareholders [Steitz, pp. 185 and 196].
The German capitalist founders of the first big railway
companies such as Camphausen, the President of the Handelscammer (Chamber of Commerce) of Cologne, and Hansemann
(already quoted) were perfectly aware that they could hardly
have succeeded in their projects without the help of the State
and the administration of big towns such as Cologne and
Münster. They proposed, with different modes, an alliance of
the private capital with the Junker-state administration. Camphausen, who had led the defunct project of the Rhein-weser
company, thought that the private companies could build the
tracks but with the help and control (Regalwalt) of the State and
that the latter, after a certain time, could take on the administration [Steitz, 1974, pp. 54-55]. Hansemann, the founder of the
Cologne-Minden Company, was inclined to think that the private
capital could build only the most profitable lines (with the help
of State-loans) and leave the burden of the construction of the
other lines to the State [Steitz, 1874, p.56].
However different their philosophies were, these captains of
industry agreed on the distribution of fixed interest (Zinsen) at a
minimum rate of 3, 5% to shareholders not only after the beginning of the operation but also during the period of construction
(Bauzinsen). They also admitted the State guarantee in that
these interests could be paid independently from the results of
the company (in exchange for various modalities which could
give the State the possibility of becoming a long term proprietor). These modalities were also sustained by economists,
notably List, who published a leading article in favour of the association of the State and the private capital after his come-back
from the United States in 1832 [Steitz, 1974, p. 51, quoting Mey3

It was usual during the thirties and the forties to pay only 10% of the shares.
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er, 1918]. As Steitz showed, the negotiations with the State were
very hard, notably concerning financing through public loans.
It is interesting to give an example of their results in the case
of the Cologne-Minden Company, one of the biggest projects in
the forties. After lengthy bargaining with the State it was agreed
in 1843 that the company was to be founded with share capital
(Fonds im Aktien Kapital) of 13 000 000 Taler and a participation of the Prussian State amounting to 1/7 of Share capital (it
means 1 860 000 Taler). The rest of the share capital had to be
found on the free capital market (under the condition of an initial payment of 10%). Independently from their source all shares
would receive an annual interest of 4% during the period of
construction (Bauzinsen). If there was a need for a supplement
of fixed assets this excess would either be financed by additional
share capital (with a participation of the state by 1/4) or by loan
with the authorization of the board of administration and the
ministry of finance.
Beyond financing, the statute of the Cologne-Minden Company also provided for some definition of income: after the
opening of the operations the net income (Ertrag) would be calculated by deducting the interests for bonds, the management,
administration and reparation (Unterhaltung) costs (Kosten)
and a sum for supplying a special Reserve fund4. This net income would be distributed first as a 3, 5% guaranteed interest
for shares and the rest as dividends. If it exceeded 5% of the
capital, the surplus would be shared on the basis of 1/3 for the
State and 2/3 for private shareholders. Some special provisions
were introduced concerning the role of the State. The surplus
paid to the State could be used by the latter to pay guaranteed
interests (in case of difficulties of the enterprise) or to amortize
(at nominal value) 6/7 of the capital subscribed by privates owners5.Moreover it was mandatory for the State to proceed to this
amortization if the return on the share capital was below 3,5%
when the guarantee of the State was required : in that case the
State could use the interests received on its share of capital and
the interests corresponding to the construction.
Beyond this financial data, it is interesting to mention that
certain clauses of the statutes relative to the administration of
4
This deduction could not surpass the level of 3% of share capital without the
permission of the State.
5
According to the calculation made by Hansemann, these reimbursements could take
57 years before the State could be the sole owner of the company [Steitz 1974, p.
266].
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the company provided for some prerogatives of the State [Steitz, 1974, p. 266]. The decisions about tariffs, the nomination
of the head of the board of administration, the main technical
directors and the chief accountant (Hauptkassierer) required the
authorization of the Ministry of finance. The State had the right
to nominate a member of the Directors, who was not obligatorily a shareholder but who retained the right to vote. A royal
superintendent (Kommissar) took part in the general assembly
with a minimum of 1/7 of the voting power (at the start, with a
progressive rise of this proportion to 1/4 and even 1/3 after 35
years). These clauses were written in 1843 after the publication
of the law of 1838 governing the railway companies but all the
ideas expressed in the Cologne-Minden statute and the law of
1838 (see below) had already been expressed as early as 1832 by
List and also by Camphausen during the long negotiation that
led to the failure of the Rhein-Weser project from 1837 to 1838
[Steitz, 1974, pp. 182-201].
The main lesson to be taken from these texts for our purpose is that there was an interaction of different types of influences at the head of the private railway companies: an influence
of capitalist owner-managers submitted to the pressure of small
and “hurried” shareholders and an influence of representatives
of the State or of regional administrations. This diversity of influence, of course, was a critical point for the development of accounting as it has already been stressed at the heroic time of the
first railways by Von Reden, the director of the Berlin-Station
railway [1843, p. 300], and also later by Mieles, whose declarations are worthwhile quoting:
“usually, the accounting system of German railway
companies has been influenced both by the merchant
and the public finance way of thinking. At the beginning of the railway period in Germany merchants and
public treasury people gathered together. The Treasury
accountant6 (Kameralist) had to recognize the merchant objectives ... and become used to the essence of
merchant vision, the desire of profit. On the contrary
the merchant had to adapt to the representation of the
public finance accountants: this explains why a special
form of accounting arose” [Mieles, 1932, p. 29].

6
Steitz interestingly notes that in the thirties, on the level of the Prussian
administration, high officers such as Nagler (director of the Post Office) and
Rother (who led the negociation with capitalists such as Camphausen ) only knew
the public finance (Kameral) accounting [1874, p. 79].
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We are now going to analyse what was, for early Prussian
railways, this “special form of accounting” and which rules
applied to it.
THE EARLY REGULATION OF 1838-1839 AND THE
BIRTH OF THE PRUSSIAN RAILWAY ACCOUNTING
The first clear and general representation of the initial Prussian accounting system for railways companies was given by a
law published in 1838 and a commentary made in 1839 by the
Prussian administration. The Law of railways (Eisenbahngesetz)
of “November 3, 1838” was promulgated at a time when there
was no strict regulation in Prussia concerning the joint stock
companies. The main articles concerning accounting were articles 29, 33, 34 and 38 which we will reproduce hereafter.
Article 29 : “The company has to determine its receipts
(Bahngeld) in order to cover “the costs (Kosten) of
maintaining and managing of the railway”...;take account “of a statutory contribution for collecting a reserve fund (Reserve funds) for extraordinary outlays
(Ausgaben) concerning the way and the accessories”;
“cover other expenses (Lasten) such as the taxes provided at the Article 38”...; “benefit from a net surplus
(Reinertrag) including both interest and profit (Gewinn) corresponding to an amount not exceeding 10%
of the capital invested (Anlagekapital) and no less than
6% of this capital”;
Article 33: “If after deduction of all expenditure (Ausgaben), including the annual amount provided for supplying the reserve fund, the net surplus exceeds 10%
of the invested capital the administration is entitled to
demand a reduction of the transportation prices”.
Article 34: “For the sake of the execution of the articles
29-33 the company has to take into account precise accounting (Rechnung) on every part of its undertaking
(Unternehmung) and to follow for that purpose, the
indications given by the Ministry of Commerce. The results of this accounting are to be transmitted every year
to the administration”.
Article 38: “The railway company must pay a tax (Abgabe) which is based on its surplus after deduction of
all management and maintaining costs as well as the
amount of the contribution to the reserve fund”.
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Some conclusions can be drawn from these articles. The
main one is that contrary to the uses and the laws concerning the merchants, there was no formal obligation to make a
patrimonial balance sheet that could include the assets and the
liabilities. This point has already been stressed by the German
literature of the late 19th [Schüler, 1879, p. 65] and the early
20th centuries [Passow, 1919, p. 241]. The law asked the companies to draw up a cash flow account describing the cash receipts
(Bahngeld) and the cash payments (Ausgaben). Of course at that
time there was a lack of precision about the terminology (sometimes expenditure was replaced by cost) but the text clearly
implied a cash flow accounting system. This was also Schüler’s
[1879, p. 65] and Passow’s [1919, p. 237] opinions. However it
was not a pure cash flow accounting. Indeed, the law foresaw the
possibility (but not the obligation) to deduct a yearly amount
from the revenue for “future extraordinary outlays”. This
amount, in our opinion, was clearly an element of expense and
not a call on the net income7. The whole system seemed to be
devoted to regularly distributing the extraordinary outlays over
the periods; if used, this device led to a substantial modification
of the traditional cash flow accounting system and constituted
an important step toward an accrual accounting system.
The other conclusions concern the goal of the system and
the concept of profit. It seems that the whole accounting system
was devoted to three main tasks: the evaluation of the profitability of the companies (that must not surpass the upper limit
of 10% of the invested capital), the calculation of the mass of
distributable dividends and the determination of the basis of
taxation. According to the law (§ 29) the profit (Gewinn) was
calculated after deduction of the interest (Zins) paid to the
shareholders as a normal and automatic remuneration of their
capital, independently from any profit. Keyssner [1875, p. 100]
has shown that this stipulation was the legalization of a former
practice: he quotes examples of statutes (accepted before the
publication of the law) containing this conception of profit such
as those of the Berlin-Postdamer Eisenbahngesellschaft (1837)
and of the Dusseldorf-Elberfeldergesellschaft (1837). As the famous lawyer noted [1875, p. 128] this conception was contradic7
Passow [1919, pp. 247-248] underlines that the expression “Reserve fund”
is an ambiguous if not unfortunate one. Generally, in matter of traditional
commercial accounting (at the time of Passow), a reserve is an accumulation of
profits; but Passow acknowledges that, as a matter of fact, the Reserve fund may
be understood as a renewal fund (Erneuerungsfonds) created by deduction of
expenses from revenue [1919, p. 249].
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tory to the view of traditional jurists inherited from the Roman
tradition notably of Anschütz and Von Völderndorff so as of
Puchelt. In our view, it was promoted by managers and economists (Keyssner mentions the influence of the economic science
[1875, p. 127]) to reassure shareholders that their share capital
was as safe as that of creditors’ investments.
In brief, to achieve these objectives, the first Prussian law
on railway companies eliminated the traditional balance sheet
of the merchants, adopted the model of cash flow accounting
as the basis (principle) of determination of profits, but provided
a modification of this model to resolve the problem of extraordinary expenditures. These elements are already important to
grasp the nature of the initial railway accounting system. However they are not totally clear: what specifically was this cash
flow accounting system? Fortunately, the Prussian administration provided the answer to the question soon after the publication of the law.
THE PRUSSIAN INSTRUCTION OF JANUARY 1839
As emphasized by Mieles, [1932, p. 10] the main points of
the explanations furnished by the Prussian Minister of Finance
deal with distinctions between different cash out-flows. Before
presenting the solution of the Minister it must be said, in accordance with Mieles {1932, p. 48], that, normally speaking,
in the frame of a pure (true) cameral (cash flow accounting)
system, all the expenditures (with exception of the repayment
of share capital8) must be treated as diminutions of the profit
of the year. But the Ministry, in line with legislation or practices
already widely adopted abroad, decided that one must distinguish two kinds of expenditures. Firstly, expenditures that do
not influence the annual result (erfolgsunwirksame Ausgaben),
such as expenditures for the construction and also those for
modernising the tracks (as far as conceded by the government
and financed by shares).Secondly, expenditures that influence
the result of the year, (erfolgswirksame Ausgaben), such as
expenditures for the acquisition of inventories, (Betriebsinventorium), for maintaining the tracks, for transportation and for
administration.
The reason for this “anomaly” in the frame of a cash flow
8
As noted by Mieles [1932, p. 48] in cameral accounting cash inflows
corresponding to the payment by shareholders of the capital can obviously not
be considered as a receipt for the sake of determination of the yearly result;
similarly, repayment of share capital is not an element of expenditure.
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based system is obvious: it was «impossible» to treat the early
and costly expenditures for the construction of the tracks as an
element of the yearly result for it would have caused losses and
prevented the shareholders from receiving any profit over a long
period of time (if the distribution of dividends were based on
the accounting figures). Accordingly, the only possible solution
to this problem was to agree that expenditure for construction
was not an element of result: this was the first but decisive infringement to pure cash flow accounting. This is the reason why
Mieles was right to affirm that it was not strict cameral (cash
flow) accounting but a «special form» of cameral accounting»
[1832, p. 49].
This important concession was able to satisfy the companies. As we are going to see later on, some German accounting
laws gave rise to numerous protests. However, this was apparently not the case with the law of 1838: we have not found any
trace of protestation against this law in German literature. Even
before the promulgation of the law, it seems that the choice of
private companies was in favour of a similar type of accounting. Schüler [1879, p. 65] says that in the statutes of the older
railway companies, the result was obtained only «on the basis of
the relationship between cash receipts and expenditures». Passow [1919, p. 247] quotes the case of the Rhine-Company which,
in 1837, had a statute presenting a clause of a reserve fund.
Mieles [1932, p. 10] deems that the law of 1838 was a «recognition» of practices that had existed earlier on. After the promulgation of the law, from 1838 to 1843, the companies apparently
respected the schedule fixed by the comparison of receipts and
expenditures.
According to Passow [1919, p. 247] most statutes provided
for a reserve fund but there were differences as to the treatment
of this fund. The majority of the companies drew funds after
distribution of a minimal dividend9 but some companies did
this by registering expenses before profit calculation10. Although
there was formally a big difference between the two kinds of
formation of the reserve fund, Passow [1919, p. 249] notes that,
as a matter of fact, both systems aimed at providing for renewal
of the fixed assets.
9
It is for example the case of the Bonn-Kölner Eisengesellschaft in 1841
[Passow, 1919, p. 247).
10
Passow [1919, p. 248-249] and Mieles [1932, p. 10] quote the case of the
Berlin-Stettiner Gesellschaft (1840); there is also the case of the Köln Minden
company in 1848 for a part of its fixed assets [Mieles 1932, p. 10].
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THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE LAW OF 1843
AND THE MANOEUVRES OF THE ADMINISTRATION
With the law of “November 9, 1843”on the Joint Stock
Companies (Über die Actiengesellschaften) the Prussian Government made provision for a specific11 regulation of the Joint
Stock companies, for the first time. Paragraph 24 of this law
stated that the board of directors had to keep such accounting
books as to give “a view of the patrimonial situation” (Übersicht
der Vermögenslage) and in the first three months of every commercial year had to draw up a balance of the wealth (Vermögen)
of the company. Moreover, the paragraph 17 mentioned the
principle of the fixity of capital. According to one of the best
specialists of commercial law of the 19th century a strict lecture
of this law could have rendered impossible for railway companies to produce mere “management balances”, which means
results based on cash flows, and have required taking account
of the values of assets and liabilities [Von Strombeck, 1882, p.
467]. However, fortunately for the state administration and the
managers responsible for railways, this law was very imprecise:
there was no information concerning the valuation of assets
and liabilities and no determination whether the balance sheet
would be the basis for the distribution of dividends .This fact is
stressed by Schüler [1879, p. 66]. With such a margin of flexibility it was possible for the administration and the managers
of railway companies to ignore the law and to go on using the
principles stipulated in the law of 1838.
As Passow shows [1919, p. 232] the Prussian administration
went on accepting statutes where profits were only based on the
comparison of receipts and expenditures: this was notably the
case of the statutes of Bergish-Markish (1844) and the BerlinHamburger railway Joint Stock companies12. A little later on,
this resistance of the German railway commercial administration was fostered by the decisions of the tax administration. On
the 30 May 1853, a tax law on railways (Eisenbahnsteuergesetz)
stipulated in its article 2 that “the net profit (Reinertrag) of the
railway firms is considered as the distributable amount ... after
deduction of administrative, maintenance and management
costs, together with the necessary contribution to the reserve
fund and the amounts for the planned retribution and repay11
The ALR law was not a specific law on joint stock companies [Laux, 1998,
p. 41].
12
In the same vein, Mieles [1932, p. 34] who confirms that the law of 1843
has not been applied by the Köln Minden and the Nieder Markisch companies.
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ments of the borrowings...». This definition of profit was totally
in line with the kind of cash flow accounting advocated by the
Minister of Commerce. As Schüler [1879, p. 66] emphasized,
this law also disregarded the patrimonial balance sheet.
After this date the Ministry of Commerce continued its
“play” with the commercial law of 1843: in 1856 this Ministry
published a list of recommendations to be followed so that the
statutes of the railway companies could be admitted [Passov,
1919, p. 239]. This time the administration acknowledged that
the net profit (Reingewinn) had to be based on the registration
of the movements of the balance sheet and not on the calculation of the difference between the receipts and the expenditures
[Passow, 1919, p. 239]13. But this conclusion remained purely
formal. Passow [1919, p. 239] shows, on the basis of some published statutes, that the Ministry “went on to accept statutes in
contradiction” with the law of 1843.
The evolution of the situation was however worth noting
on one single point: the case of “interests” on shares. Under
the pressure of the lawyers it was decided that there could no
longer be any interest distributed to the shareholders after the
construction of the railway but only dividends. However this
practice of interest could be admitted during the period of construction on the condition that the company could determine
the period of construction and the rate of interest (article § 17
of the law): this concession was obviously obtained for the satisfaction of “hurried shareholders” despite the opposition from
strict-minded lawyers. Keyssner [1975, p. 209] notes that this
new regulation constrained the railway companies, notably the
Cologne-Minden Company, to modify their statutes.
THE LATE EVOLUTION FROM 1843 TO 1861:
TOWARDS A KIND OF “DYNAMIC” ACCOUNTING
In 1838, as we have seen, the supremacy of the cash flow accounting had been admitted for the calculation of the profit for
railway companies. The registration of a yearly expense for anticipating extraordinary expenses was only a possibility opened
to the interested companies. This situation changed at the end
of the fifties as in 1857 the Ministry of commerce launched an
inquiry concerning the question of the “funds” of the railway
companies14. It was apparently intended to clarify the terminol13
This acknowledgment is confirmed by a circular instruction of March 29,
1859 [Von Strombeck, 1882, p. 481].
14
These developments are mainly based on Passow [1919, pp. 249-253]. For
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ogy, the structure and the goal of these funds and to discuss the
possibility of a move towards a more systematic use, with the
directors.
The first result of this enquiry was to distinguish two kinds
of funds: the reserve funds (Reservefonds) and renewal funds
(Erneuerungs fonds). The role of the “Reservefonds” was said
to deal with extraordinary and non customary expenditures
such as flooding and accidents. The role of renewal funds was
restricted to cope with the problem of expenditures for renewals
so as “to permit, as much as possible, the equilibrium (Gleichmässigkeit) in the “loading” (Belastung) of the proprietors of shares
at any time” (text quoted by Passow [1919, p. 252], underlined
by the author). This was clearly an instrument to get regular dividends. As Passow says [1919, p. 251] these propositions “seem
to satisfy the directions of the railway companies”. This could
explain that only a year after a circular of “January 27,1958”
was issued by the Ministry of Finance, regretting that a renewal
fund was not provided for in all statutes and asserting that the
reserve funds were not sufficient to take account of the regular
wear and tear of the fixed assets. This administration stressed
that it was not possible to speak of a distributable profit without
an allocation to a renewal fund so as to assure the sustainability
(Nachhaltigkeit) of the dividends. Consequently, it logically demanded that the railways directions measured the importance
of the yearly allocations for the reserve and the renewal funds in
conformity with the views of the inquiry. It also required proving the respect of the disposition of this circular to get the agreement of the Ministry for the determination and the payment of
dividends. Unlike the law of 1843, this text had an immediate
practical repercussion. According to Passow [1919, p. 252], just
after the promulgation of the circular, the new statutes15 regularly provided for a renewal fund.
To conclude, apparently, in Prussia, at the end of the fifties,
the situation for railway companies seemed to be clear: the initial cash flow accounting has been transformed in a kind of accrual accounting devoted to the “regulation” of dividends, which
means, according to the Schmalenbach’s famous qualification, a
kind of “dynamic” accounting [Richard, 1998, p. 576]. But this
was without taking account of the “misfits” of the commercial law.
the same view and the same conclusions see also Mieles [1932, p. 11].
15
Even some “old railway companies” such as the Rhein Eisenbahngesellschaft
in 1858, the Bergish in 1859 and the Türingische Eisenbahngesellschaft in 1862
decided to build a renewal fund [Mieles, 1932, p. 12].
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THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF 1861 AND 1870 AND THE
UNAVOIDABLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL
AND RAILWAY ACCOUNTING
At the beginning of the sixties, lawyers from different states
were called up to lay the foundations of the first Commercial
Code for the whole of Germany. As a result, the law of “June 24,
1861”16forced all merchants (Kaufleute) to follow the rules of
the General German Commercial Code. The aim of this Code, in
line with the French Commercial Code of 1807, was to protect
the interest of creditors by drawing up a balance sheet which
enables the comparison of the market value of assets with the
bulk of debts, in the hope that the difference between these two
amounts could reach a maximum amount, in order to avoid any
problem of payment of debt in case of a failure. This type of accounting, which received the name of “static” accounting in continental Europe, [Moxter, 1984; Richard, 2005 b], was mainly
expressed in the article 29, 30 and 31 of the Code.
This type of legislation was clearly reinforcing the argumentation of those who, on the basis of the Prussian law of 1843, ascertained that the railway companies had to make a patrimonial
balance sheet. However, the defenders of the “special” railway
balance sheets could have pleaded the fact that railway companies were not merchant people or companies. But this last hope
was also lost with the second step of the commercial legislation: the law of “June11, 1870”. The articles 5 and 208 of this
law extended the rules concerning merchants and commercial
companies to every kind of joint stock (public) company, including railway companies. As stressed by Schüler [1879, p. 66] the
presentation of this law (Motiven) clearly expressed that “the
making of purely operating (Ertrags) balances and the distribution of purely annual surpluses (blossen Jahresüberschüssen) is
inadmissible”. Following the article 217 “Only the profit left can
be distributed among the shareholders, according to the annual
balance sheet (which means the patrimonial balance sheet), after
an eventual deduction for creating a reserve fund if it is provided for by the statute".
Thus, at that time, the situation was clear: the German
railway companies had the choice of either respecting the law
or fighting to change it. They chose the second option because
it was, as we are going to see, "impossible" to accept the tradi-

16

This law was applied in 1862 in Prussia [Mieles, 1932, p. 12].
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THE FIGHT OF THE RAILROADS AGAINST THE STATIC
LAWS OF 1861 AND 1870
This battle lasted about ten years from 1873 to 1883 and
mobilized practitioners as well as theoreticians along five main
stages corresponding to various declarations and articles.
The first attack was launched, not surprisingly so, by the
main contesters, the managers of railway companies. In 1873 a
special commission was nominated by the Prussian government
to study the problems connected with the railway concessions
(Spezial Kommission zur Untersuchung des Eisenbahn-Konzessionwesens). Among the participants was Scheele, the president
of the Reichseisenbahn, who declared that “a part of the stipulations of the law of 11 June 1870, especially those concerning the
balance sheet, the calculation of dividends and the bankruptcy
are not suitable for railway companies”. He added that the value
of assets” should not be obtained on the basis of their separate
components, but according to their value in use (Nutzen), it
means the profitability (Ertrag) derived from their global entity”
and that this was “important for the payment of dividends, the
determination of balance sheet and the problems of insolvency”.
He also stressed, in order to justify these assertions, that, for
railway companies, “it can be considered that the assumption
of a going concern (vermuthete Fortbestand des Unternehmens)
is integrated in the law” and concluded that “the fixed assets...
must be considered as stable items (stabile Posten) without any
impact of future reductions of value” (Declarations taken from
appendix of the report by the special Commission published in
stenographic report of the debate of the House of deputes, first
17
According to Mieles [1932 , pp. 31-32] the study of the practice during the
period 1861-1884 shows that there is an appearance of the commercial balance
sheets (under the name of “general balance sheets”) in Prussia : this is notably the
case of the Rheinishe EBG(in 1862), the Berlin-Potsdam Magdeburg EBG, the
Berlin-Anhalten EBG, and later the Bergisch-Märkish EBG. However, it seems
that the railway companies did not totally respect the “play” of the new laws and
tried to introduce some “fictitious items” within the new balance-sheets that had
nothing to do with the legal balance-sheet. According to Mieles this rise of the
problems with commercial balance sheets is the reason which caused Scheffler
to intervene (see below).
18
It should be noted however that the 1862 law, while reiterating the
prohibition of interests on shares, went on authorizing the payment of these
interests during the period of construction: on this point the lawyers had taken
account of the interests of railway companies.
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session of the 12th legislature period 1873-74, third volume,
pp. 1638 and followings, with some words emphasized by the
author). To end with the subject of this special commission, it is
worth while noting that to a question concerning the desirability
to maintain the existence of interest for shares during the period
of construction the consulted expert mandated by the railway
companies replied that the consent of interest was “obvious”
and that this interest “is part of the fixed assets” [Faucher, 1873,
p. 41]. The last part of the answer testified that, for this expert,
(as well as the majority of companies) the accumulation in the
asset side of interest paid to shareholders during the period of
construction was not creating a fictitious asset contrary to the
opinion of many lawyers (see below). All these ideas were apparently largely shared by the directors of railway companies19
The second attack emanated from the judicial side. Two
years after the commission one of the leading commercial
lawyers of Germany published a long article and reiterated
after Scheele that “the distribution of dividends is not to be connected with patrimonial balances but only with the annual
calculation of operating profits (Jahresbetriebsberechnungen)”
[Keyssner, 1875, p. 135] . He stressed that anything else is "impossible" especially "the determination of the value of the expensive assets taken one by one independently from each other" [p.
133]. He also added that if a kind of value is to be considered for
the balance sheet' "it must be a value derived from the profits
(Ertrag) taking the probable duration of the firm" into account
[1875, p. 142] and that, as a practical means “the costs form the
starting point" [1875, p. 133]. In spite of these basic similarities
it seems that Keyssner provided for two new elements in the
battle against the old accounting system. First, he emitted the
idea that the comparison of assets (at value) with debts and the
maintaining of a minimum of capital were not obligatorily the
best means to protect the creditors: "the joint stock company
could have lost the half of its capital and nevertheless offered
an entire security to the creditors, the enterprise is alive if it
is capable of getting a revenue" [p. 143]. This was practically a
19
See also the declarations of Schüler, Director of the “Deutsche
Eisenbahnbaugesellschaft”, according to whom the appliance of regulations valid
for merchants could be “stupid for enterprises whose object is not handling”
[Schüler, 1878, p. 66]. Schüler agreed that the valuation of tangible assets and
financial participations should basically based on value in use («Macht zu
Nutzen») but, insofar as these values are very difficult to obtain, it is better to
content with acquisition costs [ p. 67]. In any case the recourse to market value
could be “a calamity” [p. 67].
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new conception for the time according to which the protection
of creditors was obtained so long as the current revenues covered the current expenses. Thanks to that position, it "could be
possible to distribute dividends to the shareholders even if the
whole of the capital is not covered by assets" [Keyssner, p. 143].
Second, he enlarged the scope of the reforms in proposing this
scheme for all joint stock companies (and not only railway companies) "the obligatory patrimonial (the one that calculates the
liquidation value for the owner of the business) balance sheet
could disappear" and be replaced, for the sake of distribution of
dividends, by an another type of balance sheet allowing for "an
equal division of profits" [p. 144].
The third and neuralgic element of the new course was an
article published in 1878 by another lawyer, J. von Strombeck
(from Magdeburg) whose ideas also played a significant role
in the course of the battle. Von Strombeck, as well as all the
preceding actors, admitted that the problem of distribution of
dividends for joint stock and especially railway companies was
a crucial one and that it was very important to find some means
to cope with the problem of “the necessary weak returns in the
first year of operation” and to “avoid any influence of fluctuation
of prices on the stable assets” [1878, I, p. 17]. He also asserted,
as did Keyssner, that, from the part of creditors, “the agreement
of credits should not be based on the importance of the capital
in its relationship to the wealth (patrimonium) but on the profitability of the fixed assets” and that the traditional legal position
was not a convenient one [1878 I, pp. 3 and 23]. These two first
elements allowed him to declare, in line with his predecessors,
that the legal (“static”) balance sheet based on market values
was not convenient for shareholders (for the distribution of dividends) and even for creditors, especially in the case of railway
companies [1878 I, p. 3].
The originality of Von Strombeck seems to rely on the fact
that he proposed a way of reasoning for a systematic construction of various types of balance sheets. According to him the
content and the valuation of the various assets of companies
depended on the “aim” (Gegenstand or Zweck) of this company or of this balance sheet20 [1878 I, p. 4 and 1878 I, p. 94-95].
Thanks to this basic principle he distinguished three fundamen20
On the beginning of the article (p. 4) the Von Strombeck’s classification
deals with different types of companies; but on pages 2 and 29 he specifies that
inside a same company various types of assets are to be found which can be
classified along his principles.
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tal categories of fixed assets for joint stock companies [1878, I,
p. 4]. The first class comprises assets devoted to the “use in a
permanent propriety” [1878 I, p. 4]. Concerning this kind of assets (companies using this type of assets) the rest of the article
shows that there is no question of making valuations based on
the market values: the assets should appear as stable assets (stabile Grundvermögen) with a valuation at cost. For most of these
kinds of assets their usage creates a depreciation (Entwerthung
aus Abnützung) which must be, as in the case of railroads, compensated by a restoration (Instandhaltung) owing to a deduction out of revenue so that the assets remained stable [1878 I,
pp. 5-6]. The second class comprises assets intended to be sold
[1878 I, p. 6] and forms the variable fixed assets. These assets,
as illustrated by numerous examples throughout the article,
are valued at their exit value (Veraüsserungswerth). The third
class is specifically devoted to the assets of insurance companies
[1878 I, p. 7]. According to the latter, this kind of company has
to treat its assets according to the principles laid for the second
class [1878 I, p. 33]. According to these rules, the fixed assets of
railway companies and many joint stock companies could be
valued at cost, which was satisfactory to avoid price fluctuation
and their incidence on the distribution of dividends [1878 II, p.
76].Von Strombeck, differing from other specialists, was aware
that this type of balance sheet was contradictory to the law and
proposed to change it not only for railway companies but also
for all joint stock companies [1878 II, p. 106] He was convinced
that these questions and especially the question of the basis for
distribution of dividends were of public interest [1878 II, p. 84]
at least for railway companies.
The fourth attack against the static law was launched in
187921 by Hermann Scheffler, a railway director of the Braunschweig Company. Scheffler was very conscious that the whole
affair on the discussion of various balance sheets was fundamentally a social conflict opposing the “creditors” who want
what he called an “objective value” (objektiver Werth”), which
means market value, and the “proprietors” (in our view the
shareholders for railway company) who want cost value [1879,
p. 34]. He recognized that there was a competition of many possible principles of accounting [1879, p. 20]. He also thought that
the construction of a balance sheet depended on the aim the
assets are detained for but he added that this aim was connected
According to Mieles [1932, p. 13] Scheffler had presented his thesis as soon
as 1875.
21
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to an analysis of the purposes of the various stakeholders. According to him the value of an asset that only a proprietor is interested in, (such as a machinery) is the subjective value for this
proprietor, which practically speaking, means the cost [1879, p.
23].On the contrary, for objects to be sold, which is of interest to
other people than proprietors, the value is the “objective value”,
which basically means the exit (market) value [1879, p. 24]22.
Interestingly, Scheffler was a strict defender of the theory
of cost value for “objective” elements: he made it clear that
“no circumstantial event, no variation of price, no variation
of profitability and other external time related conditions can
change the cost value of assets for use: only the loss due to use
must be taken into account and notably with the formation of
systematic annual depreciation [1879, pp. 26-27]. Even material
inventories such as rail inventories are not to be impaired [1879,
p. 40]. More surprisingly, at least for the traditional lawyers but
also even for the railway managers of the time, Scheffler was
persuaded that every intangible long term investment must be
treated as a fixed asset to be depreciated, even foundation costs
and education costs [1879, p. 39]: he was a defender of what has
been called afterwards, at the time of Schmalenbach, the pure
dynamic school!
All these ideas were connected to the problem of profit regulation; Scheffler notably said that the cameral (cash) accounting
is “not rational because it can cause a considerable fluctuation
of profit” [1879, p. 14]. If he did not explicitly mention the
case of the static patrimonial accounting it is obvious that all
his work was intended to abolish this type of accounting. It is
worthwhile noting that, according to Scheffler, the demolition
of this type of accounting was not necessarily connected to the
replacement of the law: he thought that the articles 29 and 31 of
the 1870 law were sufficiently vague about the concept of value
(Werth) so as to admit the cost as a basis of accounting foundation for joint stock companies [1879, p. 20]. In this case a simple
evolution of the case law would have been sufficient.
The last part of the story once again concerns von Strombeck whose second article devoted to the question of the making of balance sheet for joint stock companies in 1882. Von
Strombeck, like Scheffler, recognized that the problem with
the static balances was not one of practical valuation difficulty:
22
Scheffler (p.24) however distinguishes two kinds of objective value: the first
one for long term resale (based on actuarial calculation) and the second one for
short term resale (based on market value).
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it is always possible if one has decided to apply this theory to
find market values, even if necessary, to liquidate value (Abbruchwerth) [1882, p. 491]. No, the problem was a conflict of
interests between shareholders and creditors implying two kinds
of ways to determine a profit [1882, pp. 460, 494 and 495]. Von
Strombeck was aware that abandoning the patrimonial balance
sheet and its objective value could be dangerous because the
new theory of creditor protection by the sole observation of the
operating cash flows may, in case of crisis, have as consequence,
the disappearance of the companies [1882, pp. 494-495]23. But
a special balance sheet was “required” for dividends [1882, p.
461]. This “dira necessita” (strong necessity) “must lead to the
system of stable accounts” [1882, p. 495]. Differing from Scheffler, he maintained that the 1870 law was clearly in favour of
market values and not liable to an interpretation in favour of
cost, he underlined that there was no other way to change the
law: it was even “a matter of public interest” [1882, p. 483)].
THE VICTORY OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERS
AND THE NEW 1884 LAW
This victory was obtained in two steps, the second one being the definitive one. The first break against the 1870’s legislation was obtained in 1879 with a case from the ROHG (High
Imperial Tribunal) handling the valuation of fixed assets of
railway companies. It was declared, in line with the Scheffer’s
thesis, that the valuation at acquisition cost was not strictly
contradictory to the law (ROHG, 1879, Bd 25, p. 307). Even if
important, this decision was restricted to the case of railway
companies and subjected to criticism according to some leading lawyers who deemed it was a denial of the spirit of the law.
Obviously this case was not sufficient to solve the problem. The
definitive solution to the problem was given by a change of the
law. A new law, the 1884 law (Aktienrechtsnovelle vom “July 18,
1884”, RGBI, p. 123), was specifically dedicated to joint stock
companies, and added new articles to the corpus for joint stock
companies, notably the articles 185 a and 185 b which are very
important for the question treated and which deserve to be
quoted fully.
The article 185a requires that for the construction of the
balance sheet, the four following rules (referring to article 31)
23
In a very modern way he “answered” to this anxiety by asserting that
creditors must make a personal valuation of the risks they take before lending to
a business [1879, p. 35]. Scheffler presumably influenced Von Strombeck.
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must be applied:
1. Shares, obligations and merchandises which have a
stock market or market price may be valued up to
this price... but if this price is above the acquisition
or the production cost this cost is the maximum
limit not to be exceeded.
2. The other assets (elements) composing the wealth
(“andere Vermögens Gegenstände”) are to be valued
to the limit of the acquisition or production cost.
3. Fixed assets and other items which are not devoted
to reselling but to durable use... may be valued, with
no consideration to an inferior value (geringeren
Wert), at the acquisition or production cost, under
the condition that a systematic deduction for their
use (Abnützung) or a corresponding allocation to a
renewal fund (Erneuerungs fonds) will be made.
4. The cost of organisation and administration may not
be registered as assets and must appear for their full
amount as expenditure (Ausgabe) in the calculation
of the annual profit.
According to the official justification of the law itself [Motiven zu Novelle 1884] this new legislation was composed of two
very distinct elements. The first element was the recognition of
the principle of prudence: from 1884 onwards, for joint stock
companies, it was no longer possible to recognize non-realised
profits. This was in line with the evolution of patrimonial (static)
accounting in continental Europe and justified, as was the case
in France about twenty years ago, by scandals related to the
distribution of dividends on the basis of potential profits. If the
new law had been limited to the recognition of this principle, it
could not be said that the shareholders had succeeded in introducing a new philosophy of accounting in their favour. This can
be explained by the obligation to take account of potential losses
on behalf of diminution of values which would have remained
and caused problems.
The very original element of this law was represented by the
§ 3 of article 185 a that gave the possibility to joint stock companies to avoid the impairment of fixed assets (at their lower
market values) and to use a cost valuation assorted with a systematic depreciation. The explanations (“Motiven”) of the law
are very clear that this new device for fixed assets was dictated
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by a question of dividends: “if the company had been obliged to
take account of market values even for this kind of assets, whose
selling price are subject to considerable fluctuation of prices due
to the relationship of supply and demand, without their value in
use (Nutzungswert) could be changed, it would have resulted a
full untrue distribution of profits” [Motiven, p. 301]. The “Motiven” were also very clear that this part of the legislation was
an exception to the general “static” rules which remained in
place: “the project of law, in relationship with the paragraph 31
of the Commercial Code, takes as a basic principle, that all patrimonial assets are to be valued at their value (it means market
value) but no higher than their acquisition or production cost"
[Motiven, p. 303]. But this exception was the only exception: the
generalisation of a system of distribution of costs as proposed
by Sheffler for intangible long term expenses was not accepted
as it was notably clearly expressed for organisation and administration costs (see supra article 185a-4).
THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE INFERRED BY THE
PRUSSIAN RAILROAD ACCOUNTING
In our opinion the events described above clearly show
that the “time of railways” was the beginning of the death for
cash flows (“cameral”) and patrimonial (static) accounting
styles, at least in Germany. We have seen that under the influence of public accountants, at the very beginning of this period,
the thirties, a kind of cameral accounting had generally been
applied to railway companies. It is important to stress that this
cameral accounting was not a pure one for it was decided to
treat the initial expenditures (for constructions and purchase
of rolling stock) not as elements of results (as should normally
have been the case) but as an investment: it was, to use Mieles’s
expression, a “modified” cameral accounting. This already mongrel accounting was again changed in the fifties with the more
and more massive introduction of a kind of depreciation accounting instead of the registration of expenditures at the time
of renewals. Towards the end of the period studied it can be said
that, as far as private24 railway companies are considered, the
cameral accounting was over or very nearly so: this was the first
victim of the railway accounting battle.
In the seventies, railway directors and some lawyers connected to them, led another successful fight against the applica24

This assertion is untrue for state-owned railway companies up to 1927.
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tion of static (market oriented) accounting, which was at the
time, the dominant kind of accounting. In 1884, as a result of
this last fight, static accounting was no longer obligatorily applied for fixed tangible assets for all joint stock companies. It
was also the beginning of a (long) agony for static accounting
and the first clear introduction of very important elements of
historical cost accounting. Concerning this last point (the breakthrough of a kind of dynamic accounting in 1884) there is not
much debate among historians. For example, Walb [1933, p.5]
deems that there is a kind of return to the solutions of the ALR,
after 90 years. These solutions were largely marked by a refusal
of market value [Richard, 2005c], and Barth [1953, p. 117] and
constitute a “decisive breach” (entscheidende Bresche) in the
common market value (gemeinenWert) for balance sheet valuation. However, Schneider, [1995, p.151], while commenting on
the 1884’s law, is more struck by the appearance of the principle
of prudence (lower of cost or market rule) than the development
of any kind of dynamic accounting.
THE REASON FOR THE CHANGE
There is considerable debate concerning the reason for
change, in comparison to the points previously developed. First
we are going to highlight what appears to be the opinion of German historians before giving our own interpretation.
Barth insists upon a technical point of view: the patrimonial (static) theory would have failed and needed to be replaced
because in “many cases, especially for fixed assets it is almost
impossible to find a reliable market value” [1950, p. 53 and
also similarly 1953, pp. 116 and 147]. He also adds a second
argument: even if these technical difficulties could be solved, it
would result in «a totally arbitrary income which has nothing
to do with the real profits (Erträge) of the enterprise” [1953,
p. 116] because rising prices could eventually trigger the distribution of unrealised profits [1950, p. 52]. It seems to us that
this second motive is not important for our case for the static
lawyers, beginning with first the French and 25 then the German lawyers, had been able to respond to this type of criticism
(thanks to the lower of cost of market rule) with no change to
their basic philosophy of accounting style for the protection
of creditors. So, to conclude, the technical problem remains
Barth’s main argument.
25

According to Dupin notably as quoted by Barth himself [1950, p. 52]
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The Schneider’s thesis is another one which means competence problem. Schneider [1995, pp. 132-133] stresses that
throughout the twentieth century “the discussion of financial
accounting was dominated by lawyers” who were unaware of
merchant book keeping and that, as an exception, was unfamiliar with double book keeping which led a commercial lawyer
(meaning Keyssner who led this fight against static accounting)
to calculate distributable profit separately from the balance
sheet".
In our opinion all these arguments cannot explain the
real reasons of the change. As far as the technical argument is
concerned, it is interesting to note that von Strombeck himself,
a strong partisan of the "system of stable accounts", however,
acknowledged that "the reason for its adoption was not so much
the difficulty to find a true valuation of fixed assets as rather the
possibility to use, in particular for the distribution of dividends,
a mass of results only depending on the utilities produced by
stable wealth (patrimonium)” [1882, p. 464]. He added that "in
the case of a patrimonial balance sheet, the biggest difficulty
and the uncertainty to find an objective value must not deter
from proceeding with a valuation and that, in case of doubt... at
worst, one can use the liquidation value" [1882, p. 491].
As for the argument of competence, one can wonder why
lawyers such as Keyssner and Strombeck could inevitably
discover the virtue of merchants' bookkeeping while their colleagues, authors of the 1870's legislation, were unable to take
this step. Our explanation is that, beyond a question of competence, there was a question of social environment: these men
"discovered stable accounts" (to use the von Strombeck's expression) because they were the spokespeople for railway managers
and shareholders and expressed their needs.
But what were these needs? What was the reason for this
"impossibility" to use the patrimonial type of accounting as
evoked by Keyssner [1875, p. 133]? What was this "dura necessita" mentioned by von Strombeck [1882, p. 482] forcing to
adopt the system of stable accounts? Our answer is that "stable
accounts" (a marvellously eloquent expression) were necessary
to give stable dividends to shareholders, a sine qua condition
to collect funds and to develop railway companies and big joint
stock companies. The importance of the stable dividends question is not only acknowledged by German historians of railway
economics. At that time this question also constitutes the very
framework of reasoning for all the defenders of dynamic accounting versus static accounting. Whether it is the case of
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Keyssner [1875, p. 144], of von Strombeck [1878 II, p.76] or of
Scheffler [1879, p. 14] their common fear was price fluctuation
and its influence on dividend distribution. Even the documents
explaining the motives for the 1884 law, have, as we have seen,
evoked the problem of dividend stability. Our conclusion is that
the birth of a specific type of accounting for railway companies
and the promulgation of a specific law for joint stock companies
was due to the need for greater dividend stability. This could not
have been reached with the previous types of accounting.
This stability was not only required for the sake of one particular shareholder. It was also required for distributing investment products equally among the different shareholders who
had been participating in this investment all through the period.
To summarize, the birth of historical cost dynamic accounting
in German legislation was a product of shareholders craving for
stable and equally distributed dividends over time.
THE EXISTENCE OF A THEORY
The previous developments have shown that during the
period 1870-1884 all the main actors of the struggle against the
patrimonial accounting defended a kind of historical cost (dynamic) accounting. One interesting question is to know if they
have succeeded in the creation of a (new) theory of accounting.
This question had already been raised by German authors notably by Walb, Barth and Schneider who disagree over this. We
are relating their position before expressing our own opinion.
As early as 1983, Walb, in his history of the balance sheet
dogma, deems that Scheffler “has made an important step in
matter of accounting theory” [1933, p. 11]. He thinks that Scheffler had “conscious dynamic objectives” [1933, p. 15] and had
finally “opened the road for the whole of the future evolution”
[1933, p. 17]. Also Mieles [1932, p. 13] insists upon the influence
of Scheffler on the thoughts of the great theorist, Simon. On the
contrary, according to Barth, it was only after the publication of
the 1884 law on joint stock companies that the theory of balance
sheet tried to find a justification for the use of cost valuation in
matter of balance sheet dressing” [1953 I, p. 117]. Barth thinks
that the movement of ideas towards the historical cost accounting system before 1884 was not conscious, only inspired by
practical point of views [1953 I, pp. 156-157].
If we concentrate our study on Scheffler, who benefited
from the whole intellectual contribution of Keyssner and von
Strombeck, we may observe that, in order to justify his position
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in favour of an historical cost accounting, Scheffler uses the
concept of goal (Zweck) to distinguish different types of assets
(assets for permanent use, assets for sale). He also deducts a
type of valuation from this classification (valuation at cost for
assets for use, valuation at market price for assets for sale) and
infers from the two previous points an adequate treatment for
the main types of assets. Is there any big difference, for these
main elements with the ideas expressed after the First World
War by theoreticians of the dynamic balance sheet such as
Rieger and Schmalenbach? Not in our opinion. It would seem
that Scheffler was an even more consequent theoretician than
Schmalenbach in so much as he deducted the treatment as assets of intangibles expenditures such as organisational costs
from his theory. As a matter of fact Scheffler, as well as von
Strombeck, were, contrary to Barth’s view, perfectly aware of
the fact that they lived a battle of ideas about conflicting modes
of calculation of profits (see notably von Strombeck [1882, p.
460]). They were even conscious that they defended the interests
of shareholders against those of creditors. Their articles not only
suggest a list of practical wishes: they also constructed along a
hypothetical-deductive reasoning, and offered the framework of
a social theory for historical cost accounting.
For the first time in Germany, if not in the world, the framework of a social theory for historical cost accounting was clearly
expressed.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRUSSIAN RAILWAY
ACCOUNTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL
LEGAL ACCOUNTING
A classical, if not dominating thesis, is that railroad accounting has played a major role in the development of accounting concepts, especially concerning depreciation, and
more generally in the development of modern accounting
theory. The traditional references are those of Holmes [1975]
and Boockholdt [1977]. But a German author had expressed the
same thesis as early as 1933: “the theory of balance sheet was
driven to more clarity by the enterprises with large fixed assets
especially railways. This evolution made of the profit and loss
statement the main statement” [Walb, 1933, p. 7 and 17]. As
Walb’s assertions were never translated into English, his views
were condemned to oblivion. According to Holmes [1975, p.
18] “depreciation was a knotty problem for these early railroad
accountants. They argued over it... but in the end it was from
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the very ashes of their disagreements that a modern concept of
depreciation arose, Phoenix like, fifty years later”. Boockholdt
while sustaining the same idea [1977, p. 14] enlarged it: “many
of the basic concepts of accounting theory such as disclosure,
matching measurement of cash flow, had origins in railroad accounting” [1977, p. 9]. However this thesis has been contested
by Lemarchand after his study of the historical development
of railroad accounting in France. According to Lemarchand, in
a general way, if it is likely that, in matter of management, the
railway companies have had an influence on the working of enterprises belonging to other sectors; it does not seem so obvious
that their accounting behaviour could truly have had an influence likewise. [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 525].
If we take the example of systematic depreciation (with
distribution of cost over the period of use of the fixed assets)
it could hardly be maintained that this concept has been created by railway accountants both in France and in Germany. In
France Lemarchand has shown that, as far as practice is concerned, some examples of such a systematic depreciation can
already be found in the 18th century (especially in the second
part) : depreciation of horses at the “Forge d’Oberbruck et Manufacture de fer blanc de Wegsheid” in 1739 [Lemarchand, 1993,
p. 97], depreciation of furniture (by 5%) by the “Company Rey
and Magneval” in 1751 [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 69], depreciation
of tools, buildings and horses by the “Manufacture de toiles
peintes de Rey” between 1763 and 1792 [Lemarchand 1993,
pp. 73, 74,98], depreciation of tools by 5%) by the “Manufacture
de quincaillerie de la Charité sur Loire” in 1767 [Lemarchand
1993, p. 227], depreciation of machinery (by 4%) by the “Manufacture du Logelbach” in 1775 [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 227],
depreciation of furniture and tools (by 1/24%) by the “Manufacture royale de velours de coton de Sens” in 1778 [Lemarchand,
1993, p. 1].
The original German feature in this respect can be found as
early as 1794: it is also possible to find a legislation (Allgemeine
Preussische Landrecht - ALR - second part § 545) in Prussia concerning the calculation of profit of commercial companies with
a clause enouncing that (in case of no special stipulation by statute) the corporate fixed assets are to be systematically depreciated [Barth 1953; Lion 1928; Schneider 1987; p. 443; Schneider
1995, p. 129]26. Of course this kind of (optimally) dynamic ori26
See also Richard [2005 c] for a comparison of German and French situations
in the context of evolution of the fair value concept.
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ented legislation was soon rebutted by the static ideas of the Napoleonic Code of Commerce [Richard 2005 b and c], which was
translated into German in 1808 by Daniels [Bösselmann, 1939,
annexe 4]. The French code was notably applied in the Rhine
provinces even after the collapse of Napoleon27 [Steitz, 1974, p.
26] and inspired the endeavours of a commercial codification of
States such as Württemberg in the thirties [Barth, 1953, p. 67].
This may explain why, in Prussia, the law on joint stock companies published in 1843 no longer mentioned the possibility of a
systematic depreciation of fixed assets and presumably diverted
to a static viewpoint. Nevertheless it seems almost unbelievable
that, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Prussian merchant
and lawyer elite was unaware of the ALR and of its mention of a
dynamic style of depreciation. Furthermore, as Schneider demonstrates [1987, p. 451], it was “not usual to see systematic depreciation based on percentage of fixed assets before the second
part of the 18th century”. A number of books can also be found
(rarely during the 18th century but more frequently at the beginning of the 19th century) that describe the principle of such a
depreciation, the first author being Magelsen [1772, p.76]. The
conclusion is that railway accountants and managers have, in
no way, contributed to the creation of the concept of dynamic
depreciation. But, on the contrary, they have played a very big
role in the dissemination, the theoretical justification and the legalization of this concept. They contributed to the dissemination
because the majority of railway companies, that represented the
biggest companies at that time, applied this type of depreciation
at the beginning of the sixties. They play an important role for
the theoretical justification thanks to the publications of railway
managers or lawyers closely related to them. They succeeded
in legalizing through the articles of the 1884 law as a result of
the pressure of railway lobbyists. To summarize, there has been
dynamic depreciation and more largely dynamic theory, a dominant approach of accounting.
THE VALIDITY OF THE “MARKET FOR EXCUSES”
HYPOTHESIS
In their article about the demand and supply of accounting
theories Watts and Zimmermann [1979] outline their hypoth27
The result of this situation was that until 1861 Prussia had two law
territories: the West part under French law commercial legislation and the East
part under ALR, which was not a specific commercial legislation [Steitz 1974, p.
26].
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esis of a market for excuses according to which, in a regulated
economy, they “expect to observe changes in accounting theory
when a new law is passed which impinges on accounting practice” so that “accounting theory has changed after the introduction of government regulation” [1979, p. 289 emphasis added]. It
is clear that they base their reasoning on the case of US railroad
legislation : it is their hypothesis that regulation of profits (primarily of the railroads) “created a demand for theories rationalizing depreciation as an expense” and that “without regulation
there was no necessity for depreciation to be a charge systematically deducted each year in determining net income. However,
because rate regulation was justified in terms of restricting the
economic profits of monopolists (or eliminating ruinous competition) regulation created a demand for justifications arguing for
depreciation to be treated as an annual charge to profits” [1979,
p. 293]. They concluded that accounting theories are generally “normative” because “they are used as excuses for political
action (i.e. the political process creates a demand for theories
which prescribe rather than describe the world).” [1979, p. 273].
In the case of the German legislation for railway companies
we do not find any evidence of a market for excuses hypothesis
.In contrast to Watts and Zimmermann’s hypothesis it seems
that the change in accounting theory appeared before rather
than after the law which this theory intended to defend and
that this theory was describing an already existing practice. The
sequence of the German case is the following: at the beginning
Prussian railway companies produced a special type of balance
sheet and had a concept of profit oriented to their needs. This
practice had been largely incorporated within the law of 1838,
the fundamental law concerning rail companies. This was improved through various administrative regulations from 1838
to 1862, aiming notably at a systematic form of depreciation.
Throughout this period, to the best of our knowledge, there
has been no article or book presenting a theory in defence of
this legislation or control. The reason for this absence of theory
seems obvious: the legislation was basically in line with the
practices or the desired practices of the managers and shareholders of railway companies. Thus there was no reason to justify anything.
The scene completely changed in 1862 and 1870 when a
new law developed by lawyers working for the interests of creditors (rather than shareholders) obliged the rail companies to
produce balance-sheets in total contradiction with their vital interests. As a reaction against these laws and in order to get a new

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss1/6

30

Richard: Victory of the Prussian Railway "Dynamic" accounting over the public finance

Richard, Prussian Railway Dynamic Accounting

121

law more favourable to their interests, the railways managers
and a few astute lawyers sharing the interests of shareholders
against creditors wrote a significant list of articles in the seventies which, in our view, should be considered as founding a new
theory of what we call “dynamic accounting” or “historical cost
accounting”. This theoretical weapon in favour of a new law
succeeded in 1884 with a law which offered all joint stock companies (and not only railway companies) the possibility of using
the dynamic theory for tangible fixed assets for the first time in
Germany.
As a conclusion, the German case shows that the theory
came before the introduction of a new law and was used to prepare it. Furthermore, this theory largely describes a practice in
line with shareholders’ interests and was frankly advocating the
basic interests of these shareholders. There was no attempt to
disguise the needs of short term and regular dividends for hurry
and worry shareholders under the umbrella of “excuses”. Based
on this case, our hypothesis is that accounting theories may be
considered as a weapon to demolish existing practices or regulations rather than an excuse or justification for existing legislation or practice.
THE VALIDITY OF THE AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory, as represented by the fundamental article
by Jensen and Meckling on the theory of the firm [1976], expresses three main ideas. Firstly, in the firm, the basic conflict
opposes on the one hand the managers and on the other hand
the “outside” equity owners and the creditors. The possibility
of a conflict between the outside equity owners and the creditors is only marginally indicated in two backside notes [1976,
pp. 337 and 339]. In fact the opposite applies, bondholders and
outside equity owners are treated together as potential victims
of the managers (1976, p. 338). Secondly, the basic conflict can
be solved by the signature of contracts concerning the monitoring activities, the bonding activities and the emission of shares:
these contracts can be fair because creditors and outside shareholders have the possibility of knowing the manoeuvres of managers in advance. Even the suppression of unlimited liability is
accepted by the creditors by means of a fair contract [1975, p.
331]. Thirdly, as implied by these two former points, accounting can be considered as an information device solicited in the
course of the issuance of fair contracts between managers and
outside claimants.
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The history of the Prussian railway accounting illustrates
that these ideas do not correspond to reality28. The main conflict in Germany opposed the creditors on the one hand and the
outside shareholders and the managers on the other hand. One
could speak of a “theory” of alliance between managers and
shareholders and not of a “theory” of agency. The losers of the
battle, the creditors, were not in a position to sign any compensatory contract. They had to accept the (partial) disappearance
of static accounting because they were weak and they did not
have the power to resist the alliance of shareholders and managers.
Accounting, in the course of this battle, was not considered
as a source of information on managers’ actions but as a means
of improving their situation as well as the shareholders’ situation in the matter of distribution of dividends. The new dynamic
theory was not devoted to calculating the performance but to
regulating the distributable profit. In short, the issue was not a
question of “fair” contracts or “fair” information but of the exercise of harsh power for the sake of the development of a new
kind of capitalism.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE ROLE OF THE PRUSSIAN
RAILWAY ACCOUNTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CAPITALIST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
On the basis of the French experience, it has been suggested that after the beginning of the industrial revolution (at
the end of 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries) the
capitalist models of regulated financial accounting went through
three main stages of development : static, dynamic and actuarial
ones [Richard, 2005 b and c]. The history of accounting of private rail companies in Germany shows that in this country the
rail companies played a major role in the spread of historical
cost accounting principles. In addition, these companies and
big other joint stock ones, largely contributed to the birth of the
“dynamic” second stage, at least in continental Europe. If the
representatives of these rail companies had not invented new
concepts of accounting, in particular concerning depreciation,
they did, as early as 1875-1879; elaborate a new theory of accounting (the dynamic theory). This new theory had a profound
impact, at least on German theorists such as Simon, Rieger and
28
For another example of this disconnection between agency theory and the
historical reality see Ding and alii [2008].
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Schmalenbach of the late 19th century and the first part of the
20th century. It was needed to justify the publication of a new
law favourable to the interests of impatient shareholders rather
than those of creditors and to defeat the ideology of public finance and patrimonial (static) theories. As this theory appeared
before (rather than after) the law which promulgated the new
approach and was clearly advocating the defence of the private
interest of shareholders (not those of the public in the strict
sense), it would seem possible to assert that the Watts and Zimmermann’s basic hypothesis of the “theory of market excuses”
does not fit with these historical developments.
According to these developments, the main reasons for developing the new accounting theory were connected with problems of dividends. Firstly it was imposed by the necessity to find
accounting procedures which would allow the distribution of
dividends from the very beginning of the investment cycle even
in the absence of revenue. Secondly it was fostered by the desire
to find an accounting model which would enable the distribution of profits generated by an investment evenly throughout the
investment cycle and amongst the different shareholders taking
part in the financing of this investment.
Hence, the second stage of development of capitalist accounting may have been caused by the question of distribution
of profits and dividends and not of information. However, as
this attempt took place within the framework of the principle of
prudence, it was impossible, at that stage of accounting capitalism, to achieve a perfect device for the regulation (smoothing)
and the rise of the rate of accounting profit: the beginning of
the solution was only to be found at the end of the 20th century
with the third actuarial stage and the “discovery” of fair value
accounting [Richard, 2004, 2005 b and 2005d].
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